Municipal Corporations - Limitations on the Power to License by Malloy, William Smith
Marquette Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 2 February 1943 Article 9
Municipal Corporations - Limitations on the
Power to License
William Smith Malloy
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
William Smith Malloy, Municipal Corporations - Limitations on the Power to License, 27 Marq. L. Rev. 105 (1943).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol27/iss2/9
RECENT DECISIONS
case. The instant case then cites the Biersach case as ruling its decision; and the
Fraundorf and Lefebvre cases fall directly in line with both the reasoning and
the rule of the Biersach case. Thus it would seem that a definite and harmonious
construction of the five-sixths jury verdict statute has been attained.
JOAN MOONAN.
Municipal Corporations-Limitations on the Power to License.-By an
ordinance of the respondent city, transient photographers were forbidden to
engage in the business of photography, or the sale of photographs, enlargements,
or coupons without first obtaining a license from the city at a cost of ten dol-
lars per business day. The defendant was arrested, tried in municipal court, and
found guilty of violating the ordinance. On the trial, it appeared that the defend-
ant was engaged in taking snapshots and forwarding the film to an out of state
photography house which paid the defendant a flat fee for each sales prospect
with an additional bonus if sales exceeded a given total. The defendant's aver-
age income was $11.33 per day, while the firm for which he worked derived a
profit of between six and seven per cent. The circuit court on appeal affirmed
the sentence of the municipal court, sustaining the city's contention that the
ordinance was valid as a revenue measure. Defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court on the ground that the ordinance was invalid as discriminatory and the
fee was unreasonable and confiscatory. The Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction on the ground that the ordinance was invalid as amounting to the sup-
pression of a lawful business and as an imposition which could not be sustained
under the taxing power of the municipality. City of Rachie v. Wayhe, 5 N.W.
(2d) 747, Wis. 1942.
The power of a municipality to require a license of those engaged in a
designated trade or profession within its boundaries and to demand a fee for
such license is recognized generally to have two sources: the police power and
the power to raise revenue. Since municipal corporations are totally the creatures
of the state, neither power can be exercised unless authorized by the charter of
the municipality or by a charter ordinance having the same effect. The granting
of one power does not confer the other, and if either the power to tax or the
power to regulate a vocation is given specifically, the courts will not infer the
existence of the other. City of Tucson v. Stewart, 45 Ariz. 36, 40 P. (2d) 72,
1935; City of Creston v. Mezvinsky, 213 Ia. 212, 240 N.W. 676 (1932); License
Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 471, 18 L.Ed. 497 (1867). Nevertheless, the state may grant to
a municipal corporation both the power to regulate and to license for revenue,
and an ordinance passed under such authorization will not be held invalid because
justified by several provisions in'a charter. Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill.
340, 52 N.E. 441 (1898) ; City of Monroe v. Endelnran, 150 Wis. 621, 138 N.W.
70 (1912).
Where the business sought to be regulated bears no reasonable relation to
the health, safety, or morals of the community ,ordinances imposing a license
can not be justified as a valid exercise of the police power. Fetter v. City of
Richmond, 142 S.W. (2d) 6 (Mo. 1940) ; City of Creston v. Meszinsky, supra.
Moreover, the same result will be reached if, though, as in the instant case,
the business might be subject to reasonable regulation, the ordinance itself shows
a contrary intention; for instance, by demanding as a condition of the license a
fee so grossly in excess of the expense of issuing the license and enforcing the
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regulation that the courts can say as a matter of law that there has been an
invalid exercise of the police power. Maryland Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, 24
A. (2d) 911 (Md. 1942).
When a muncipality lays a license upon a vocation for the purposes of rais-
ing revenue, as mentioned before, it must be able to justify its exaction by ref-
erence to a specific provision in its charter authorizing such method of raising
revenue. The power is in its nature the power to impose an excise tax on the
privilege of conducting business. Beyond the need of authorization, the only
limitations upon the power of the municipality lie in the due process clause of
the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution and in kindred provisions of
state constitutions. C. B. and Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41 L.Ed.
979, 17 S.Ct. 581, (1897).
The municipality need not restrict its taxes to those businesses which it could
prohibit entirely. Impositions have been held legal when levied upon transactions
or occupations which are matters of inherent and natural right as well as on
those made possible by virtue of statutory authority. Beals v. State, 139 Wis.
544, 121 N.W. 347 (1909).
The requirements of due process are twofold. The first and lesser constitu-
tional hurdle which an ordinance must pass is that a valid ground must exist
for setting the business sought to be licensed apart from others not so taxed.
In this respect the legislative body of the municipality has wide discretion, and
in order that the ordinance be sustained it must only appear that the classifica-
tion is not palpably arbitrary. Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Bricknell,
233 U.S. 304, 34 S.Ct. 493, 58 L.Ed. 974 (1913); followed in Campbell Baking
Co. v. City of Harrisonville, Mo., 50 F. (2d) 670 (C.C.A. 8th, 1931).
In the latter case, the Circuit Court of Appeals on a state of facts very simi-
lar to that of the principal case held that a substantial distinction did exist be-
tween transient and resident merchants, and that a license fee of two dollars a
day, imposed for revenue purposes upon all merchants with a saving clause
exempting those doing business at an established local place of business could
not be challenged as discriminatory by a non-resident bakery company making
deliveries in the city.
In addition, a revenue licensing measure must not demand a fee which is
exorbitant. Under the power to tax, municipal corporations cannot prohibit
an individual from engaging in a legitimate trade. What is reasonable as a
fee varies in individual cases and only very general principles can be laid down.
Courts have held that the city may take into consideration the population of
the city, the profitableness of the business, the nature of the business and its
effect upon the community, and the expenses incurred in supervising its en-
forcement. Ex Parte Sikes, 102 Ala. 173, 15 So. 522 (1894). The number of
persons who have found it profitable to pay the charge and remain in business,
and the amounts previously collected is also a valid consideration. Maryland
Theatrical Corp. v. Brennan, supra.
Courts have held that a flat fee license amounting to four tenth of one per
cent of gross sales is not unreasonable. Giant Tiger Corp. of Camden v. Board
of Commissioners of the City of Caiddnen, 122 N.J.L. 240, 4 A. (2d) 775 (1939).
The same court held a licensing ordinance imposing a fee of three hundred dol-
lars on each vehicle used by ice cream peddlers was void as excessive when
such tax was shown to amount to thirty per cent of the annual gross income
from the use of such vehicle. Gurland v. Town of Kearny, 128 N.J.L. 22, 24
A. (2d) 210 (1942). In Wisconsin license fees of twenty and twenty-five dollars
a day have been disposed of as confiscatory, the former by the federal district
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court without reference in the opinion to the value of the goods sold. Ex Parte
Eaglesfield, 180 F. 558 (D.C. E.D. Wis. 1910); Monroe v. Endelnan, supra.
In determining what is reasonable and what is confiscatory, courts have
tended to recognize a distinction between businesses regarded as legitimate and
those regarded as illegal in tendency. While the city may be given the power to
single out for taxation either pursuits which are a matter of natural right or
those made possible only by virtue of statute, higher fees are generally sus-
tainable in the latter case than in the former on the theory that there is a public
policy in favor of suppressing the business or at least restricting the numbers
which engage therein. City of Seattle v. Rogers, 106 P. (2d) 598, Wash. (1940).
WLIAM SMITH MaO.
Sales-Warranties by Express Representation.-Defendant set up a defense
of breach of warranty in an action on a note given in a sale of dairy cows.
In making the sale the plaintiff made the statement that, "these cows would
have to be as recommended, first class dairy milk cows and six gallons a day.
they would give.' He also promised to take back any cow that went wrong.
Within two to four weeks after the purchase of said cows they began falling
ill, and the entire herd became diseased. The infection caused the milk of the
cows to become ropey and stringy; and it soured before it could be sold. The
defendant counterclaimed for damages to his own herd. In affirming
the decision of the lower court allowing damages to the defendant the
appellate court quoted the clause of the Uniform Sales Act which pro-
vides that, "any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or
promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer pur-
chases the goods relying thereon," and held that the statement concerning the
production of the cows was an affirmation of fact by the seller relating to the
goods within the meaning of the provision of the Act above set out and was
therefore an express warranty and not a mere statement of value, or seller's
opinion, as claimed by the plaintiff, Teter v. Schultz, 93 N.E. (2d) 802 (Ind. 1942).
Although the court is guided by the provision of the Sales Act defining
an express warranty it is, nevertheless, confronted with the problem of interpre-
tation when it is required to determine if a particular statement of a seller is
an express warranty within the meaning of the Act. In arriving at the conclu-
sion that a statement is a warranty, the courts have applied various tests.
All courts agree that to constitute a warranty the affirmation of fact must be
of a material fact. Typical of the application of this rule is the case of Lloyd
et al. v. James, 198 Ark. 255, 128 S.W. (2d) 1019 (1939), where the court
instructed the jury that, "before expressions rise to the dignity of a warranty,
they must amount to a specific, definite, and certain representation of a fact that
is material, and, if you find from all the testimony in this case that the expres-
sion of the salesman who sold the defendant the truck in the controversy did
not definitely and certainly point to some material quality of the truck on which
the defendant might rely and did rely, your verdict should be for the plaintiff."
No special words of warranty are necessary. The word warranty or its
precise equivalent need not be used. "It is enough," said the Minnesota court
in Skoog v. Mayer Bros. Co., 122 Minn. 209, 142 N.W. 193 (1913), "if the vendor
definitely undertakes that the thing sold shall be of a certain kind or quality!'
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